How the West was Lost

After reading an article about Al Qaeda in the Economist recently I realized that there is no conceivable way that the United States and its allies can win the war on terror.

While the term “victory” was never really an accurate way to describe any possible outcome, our understanding of the Jihad movement itself is so inherently flawed that even the most rudimentary goals in our the battle with Islamic extremism can never be achieved. Here’s the quote from the Economist:

“To explain the movement, many experts draw parallels with globalisation. Some describe it as a venture-capital firm that invests in promising terrorist projects. Others speak of it as a global “brand” maintained by its leaders through their propaganda, with its growing number of “franchises” carrying out attacks…”

This is actually a very insightful way to describe Al Qaeda. The problem is that the description is reached through a thought process that represents a world-view completely alien to these terrorists.

Globalisation, venture capitalism, brand marketing are all western ideas that aim to make the world a better place. (How’s that going, by the way?) By labeling any factions or arms within the Jihadist movement in these terms, we fail to grasp the geopolitical reality that created the likes of bin Laden and Zawahiri in the first place. This makes the task of winning hearts and minds in fringe Islamic communities impossible.

Before we get into the heavy philosophical discussion- let’s look at the actual historical roots of Al Qeada.

To say that the United States created this enemy is true in a number of ways: beyond the obvious occupation of Islamic lands breeding an inevitable backlash, the U.S. actually gave political, financial, and logistical support to the same “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan that we are fighting today. Before we were stuck in our current quagmire in this God-forsaken wasteland, the Soviet Union was the occupying force. From 1978 to 1989 the Soviets fought in Afghanistan. Their original intention was to support Marxist forces in their struggle against the ruling Islamic parties.

Because we were absolutely determined to stop the expansion of Communism at all costs, the U.S. decided to lend its support to the mujahideen. CIA operatives were sent in to provide training and weapons to the Muslims, including one Osama bin Laden, in order to prevent the Soviet sphere of influence from growing. Eventually, the USSR was forced to withdraw in disgrace after a long war that shattered their aura of invincibility and drained vital funds and resources from the empire.

The Islamic parties maintained their hold of Afghanistan, and the country became a base for an assortment of Jihadist groups that would eventually seek to destroy their enemies beyond the region. At the same time this was happening, the U.S. was backing Saddam Hussein and Iraq in their long and bloody war with the Iranians. Thanks to our support, Hussein was able to beat back the extremist nation that had been taken over by radical Shiites. Iraq won the war and went on to live a peaceful existence free from the threats of radical Islam, living happily ever after for the rest of its days.

The lesson to be learned is that by overreacting to ideological opponents, the United States creates far greater threats than the ones they were made to fight.

Think of the U.S. as the mob in the Dark Knight, and Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein as the Joker:

“In their desperation, they turned to a man they did not fully understand.”

That one phrase is perhaps the most poignant description of our foreign policy since World War 2. All over the globe, we have lent our support to groups with common enemies: be it Communist, terrorist, or otherwise. To this day we still provide weapons and funds to corrupt regimes, dictators, and (gasp!) terrorists in the name of battling our perceived threats.

But we do not fully understand. Not by a long shot. Another quote about another hopeless war comes to mind: during an episode of the Wire, two cops watch and do nothing while rival gangs beat each other over drug turf:

Carver: You know, I think this is why we can’t win this.

Hauk: How come?

Carver: They screw up, they get beaten. We screw up, we get a pension.

The point is that the young men growing up in Baltimore and Kabul live in an entirely different world than the one that politicians and generals live in, and until we realize it, we stand no chance of winning either war.

We describe terrorists groups in terms of venture capitalism and globalisation because we assume that these are universal values and interests. American policy makers seem to believe if given the chance for a decent education and a career, none of these young men would choose to blow themselves up in the name of Jihad. Perhaps they don’t realize that bin Laden himself comes from a very wealthy and reputable Saudi family. Perhaps they don’t realize that some people aren’t interested in Democracy, or heaven forbid the thought, making lots of money.

Which is worse? A world with a growing sphere of Communist influence? Or a world filled with loosely connected terrorist groups whose goal is to destroy western civilization entirely?

Whoever said that the enemy of my enemy is my friend was clearly unqualified to direct foreign policy, which is why, even with the economy the way it is, they have a great chance of finding a job in the U.S. government.

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